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The main objective of this master thesis, titled Legal Issues of Anti-Monopoly 
Review on M&A by Foreign Investors in China, is to find and analyse the legal 
issues of the P.R.C. Anti-Monopoly Law in the area of merger & acquisition  
(M&A) review on the foreign investors.  
 
The principal source for this study has been the P.R.C. Anti-Monopoly Law, but 
other regulations issued by the State Council and the MOFCOM has played an 
important part in the study as they supplement the law. Other material important for 
the study has been published MOFCOM declaration cases, articles and statements 
from governmental agencies. 
 
The P.R.C. Anti-Monopoly Law, enacted in 2007, has played an essential role 
establishing a comprehensive regulatory regime governing competition. Since the 
advent of China’s economic reform starting to develop three decades ago, China has 
been moving to integrate its economy within the global trading system. 
 
This thesis provides an overview of the regulatory work promulgated in connection 
with the introduction of the merger and acquisition review procedure, and further 
investigates the legal issues connected to the practical execution of an M&A review 
conducted by the MOFCOM. Given my perspective as a foreign student the master 
thesis draws some comparisons to other antitrust regimes, mainly the European and 
American, but the main goal is not to compare the Chinese regime to other antitrust 
systems, but simply direct the focus on the legal issues the foreign investor may 
encounter when investing through an M&A in China. 
 
The thesis concludes that through the enactment of the P.R.C. Anti-Monopoly Law 
the Chinese government made a huge step in the direction of a more sophisticated 
market economy. And China’s continuing willingness to be transparent, fair and 
reasonable in the practical execution of the system is evident. 
 
KEYWORDS: 
M&A by Foreign Investors, Anti-Monopoly Review, MOFCOM 






Purpose of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 
 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (henceforth referred 
to as the Anti-Monopoly Law or the AML) was promulgated on the 30th of August 
20071, as an instrument to control the dynamic and fast growing market. In 1978 
China decided to reform and open up its economy. This decision, to create a “market 
economy with socialist characteristics”, has amongst other things given room to the 
foreign business community to place their interests in China, and benefit from the 
huge Chinese market. The alteration in the market has happened over a tremendously 
short period of time, and a need to protect certain aspects of the market has become 
essential. 
 
The Anti-Monopoly Law Article 1 states that the AML is enacted for the purpose of 
preventing and restraining monopolistic conducts, protecting fair market 
competition, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers 
and the interests of the society as a whole, and promoting the healthy development of 
the socialist market economy.  
 
The most conducive way to maintain a healthy market economy is to retain fair 
competition between competitors. There are several measures that can be taken to 
secure fair competition. As mentioned in Article 1 it is important to prevent and 
restrain monopolistic conduct between enterprises, and as we will see through this 
thesis it is important to implement regulations and supervise concentration of 
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companies. Through such measures the government will enhance economic 
efficiency and protect fair competition to ensure a healthy market economy to the 
benefit of the consumer and the society as a whole. 
 
The significance of an anti-monopoly law is inevitable to observe, and the Chinese 
AML, a solid piece of legislation culminated over thirteen years of debate and 
drafting, became absolutely inevitable for an economy that eventually had changed 
from a centrally planned one to a “market economy with socialist characteristics”. 
 
Similar to other competition laws, one of the AML’s main purposes is to protect the 
consumer’s interests as well as fair competition. But aside from this, the Chinese 
AML has taken into consideration some factors that some of the larger western 
competition laws have not accentuated in their laws: the safeguarding and 
development of the society and public interests, also recognized as non-competitive 
elements in the AML.2 
 
In must be borne in mind that the Chinese AML is an unique piece of legislation 
directed towards China, with its distinguished economical and political 
circumstances. It is self-evident that another culture’s anti-monopoly law would not 
be entirely suited to take care of China’s needs. In particular, some of AML’s stated 
goals reflect the special circumstances of the Chinese economy at a place of 
transition from central planning to a market economy, with large sectors of the 
economy still controlled by state owned enterprises (SOE’s). Also, an unstated goal 
of the AML may be to decrease social differences among the Chinese people, to 
counter the accepted belief that the “real evil is unfairness rather than scarcity.”3 
8	  
 
The non-competitive aspects of the law seem to be accommodating the non-market 
elements of the transitional economy. I believe it reflects the Chinese Government 
deep assessment of the society as a whole when implementing and working with the 
AML. 
 
Although the AML has some differences compared to other nations anti-monopoly 
laws, the AML has indeed been influenced by EU competition Law, and to a lesser 
extent, the antitrust laws of the United States, Germany, Japan, and other countries.4 
It is probable that China will continue to be influenced by, and also have its 
enforcement authorities collaborate with, international anti-monopoly regimes to 
continue to develop their nascent competition policy, as well as to start influencing 
other jurisdictions on global competition policy. After all, some of these anti-
monopoly regimes has existed for a long time, and have acquired valuable 
experience, beneficial to other regimes with less developed competition policies. 
 
Why We Need Merger Control on Foreign M&A 
 
In practice of investment activities in the form of M&A transactions, it is easy to 
form business concentrations which may be faced with anti-monopoly problems and 
thus creating a negative influence on fair competition of business operators. 
Regulating foreign M&A is therefore an important task for the government to sustain 
a healthy market economy. A subject of this thesis, the Chinese merger or acquisition 
control scheme, set forth in Chapter 4 of the AML5, is by far the most developed area 
of AML enforcement.  The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Anti-
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Monopoly Enforcement Authority (AMEA) with responsibility for merger 
enforcement, was heavily involved in drafting the AML. Moreover, MOFCOM 
acquired substantial preliminary experience in merger review from the interim 
merger review process, introduced in March 2003 as part of the Provisional Rules on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.6 
 
Since the implementation of the AML in 2008 to middle of 2012, the MOFCOM has 
settled 382 cases, of which has included one prohibition decision, and ten conditional 
approvals. The 371 other cases were approved without conditions.7 As of December 
26th 2012 the number of cases filed in 2012 reached 186. 154 cases were tried, and 
from that 142 concentrations were unconditionally approved. The rest was 
withdrawn or conditionally approved.8 November 16th 2012 MOFCOM announced 
that it had published the case names and names of the concentrating parties that had 
been unconditionally approved by MOFCOM. The list contains the name of all 458 
concentrations unconditionally approved so far, and shows that amongst the 
unconditionally approved concentrations there are both foreign, international and 
Chinese M&A.9 
 
MOFCOM’s enforcement record so far has resulted in an intensified awareness 
about MOFCOM and the Chinese merger or acquisition review process throughout 
the international M&A and competition law communities. 
 
Merger or acquisition control is an important tool to secure a fair and competing 
market, but it will also lead to inconveniences and expenses for the merging or 
acquiring companies. It is therefore important to keep the process as manageable and 
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clear as possible to ease the disadvantages. One way to do this is to enact 
unambiguous rules easy to interpret and follow, and to publicly disclose previous 
merger or acquisition decisions to observe how the authorities interpret the law and 
what they emphasize when they make a decision. The AML Article 30 stipulates that 
the authorities shall publish all decisions where they prohibit or impose conditions 
upon a concentration of companies. 
 
The AML Article 27 and MOFCOM’s Measures for the Declaration of 
Concentration of Business Operators10 (MOFCOM Notification Rules) stipulates the 
substantive review standards and gives valuable insight into the actual review 
process. However, MOFCOM still has not provided much visibility into its practical 
use of these substantive review standards in the actual merger cases. Nevertheless, 
the published decisions have grown increasingly detailed and reveal that MOFCOM 
has generally based all decisions they have made in theories and arguments that are 
consistent with the AML and other relevant regulation as well as those employed in 
other jurisdictions, including Europe and the United States – although without any 
details regarding the facts and evidence on which those decisions were grounded that 
would allow outside observers to completely assess them.11 
 
The Chinese AML has attracted much attention throughout the international M&A 
and competition law communities, and the MOFCOM decisions made have only 
strengthened this awareness. The development of Chinese Merger & Acquisition 
review is still in a very early stage, and it is yet to be seen how the process will 
advance in coming years.  
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This thesis provides an overview of the AML, with emphasis on the main legal 
issues the foreign investor may encounter in the M&A procedure. Chapter 1 consists 
of AML history, today’s legal structure of anti-monopoly policy on M&A for foreign 
investors in China and a brief introduction of BITs and their possible positive effect 
on the M&A review procedure. Chapter 2 states today’s legal forms of M&A under 
Chinese foreign investment law, observing that the foreign investor may only legally 
invest in China through certain company forms. Chapter 3 is the main body of the 
thesis, examining the process and requirements of anti-monopoly review on foreign 
M&A. Part IV also contains a brief summary of eight of the seventeen published 
MOFCOM decisions to date, following an assessment of the cases. Chapter 4 
contains a short introduction to the extraterritorial application of the Chinese AML 
relating to M&A, before the thesis concludes that the implementation of a Chinese 
anti-monopoly regime has been a necessary step towards a well-functioning market 
economy. Even more, the introduction of the M&A review has been efficient and 
without larger problems. M&A review regulation is under constant evolvement as 
the government becomes more and more experienced, creating a healthy 











Chapter 1 Background and Legal Sources 
 
In August 2007, the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 
enacted its first comprehensive antitrust law.12 Because of China’s long and on-going 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a “market economy with socialist 
characteristics”, it had become evident over several years that regulation in this field 
was indispensable to protect and encourage investment, services and trade. 
 
The implementation of anti-monopoly regulation is also one of the many actions 
taken over the past decade that reflects China’s increasing internationalization in the 
wake of its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
Though many jurisdictions have implemented antitrust laws over the last decades, 
none of these laws have engaged the international competition community more than 
the Chinese AML. One of the reasons may be the incredible growth in China’s 
markets, the vast amount of foreign capital invested in China, the substantial increase 
in the presence of Chinese businesses in foreign markets, the incredible sale of 
Chinese goods abroad, and a recognition of the substantial challenge posed by the 
establishment of free market competition in the Chinese socialist market economy. 
The enormous interest from the international competition community was handled 
with a great susceptibility and openness by the State Council, the MOFCOM, 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and State Administration 
of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), all of which solicited and studied a large number 
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of comments, remarks and suggestions from public and private organizations, 
companies, and academics from around the globe. 
 
As time has passed since the AML came into effect several statues and regulations 
has been promulgated by the State Council and the MOFCOM to supplement the 
somewhat more general articles in the AML. These statues and regulations play a 
large role in the practical use of the AML. Some of the more important ones for the 
foreign investor are: 
• Provisions on Foreign Investors’ Merger with and Acquisition of Domestic 
Enterprises, 
• Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Declaring 
Concentration of Business Operators, 
• Measures for the Declaration of Concentration of Business Operators, 
• Measures for the Review of Concentration of Business Operators, and 
• Guide for the Anti-Monopoly Declaration for Foreign Investor’s Merger and 
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises. 
 
These are only part of the series of regulations that have been promulgated to match 








Section 1 China’s Legal History of Anti-Monopoly Regulation 
 
”Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference. 
 As long as it catches mice, it is a good cat.” 
– Deng Xiaoping 
 
In the beginning of the 1960s, Deng Xiaoping declaimed this quintessential maxim 
of pragmatic economics. To address the extensive destitutions caused by Mao’s 
failed “Great leap forward” policies, Deng turned collectivist farms over to 
individual farmers. His suggestions to turn to free markets for peasants brought his 
denunciation as a “capitalist roader”, and he was placed under house arrest and 
exiled. After surviving other attempts of elimination, Deng and his supporters 
attained power in 1978, two years after Mao’s death. Deng almost immediately 
removed rural agricultural communes, allowing farmers to cultivate family land. 
Harvest grew promptly, and by 1984, China had reached the ability to be self-
sustained on food for the first time in modern history. In addition to this, Deng 
further pursued other types of economic liberalization, like allowing urban Chinese 
start small businesses and purchase commercial goods, and opening up the Chinese 
market to foreign investors.13 
 
These policies and subsequent structural reforms were accompanied by legislative 
implementations. To give an example; the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 
1978, and enacted by National People’s Congress in 1988, insured that factories 
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could no longer depend on state subsidy, and would have to adapt to market 
competition to avoid bankruptcy.14 The Enterprise Law of 1988 started an alteration 
of a system where the government departments were in direct control of industries, to 
a system where “the state regulate the market, which in turn guides the 
enterprises”.15 
 
As early as in the mid-1980 political leaders and legal scholars had considerable 
deliberations about implementing a competition law in China. The weighing point 
for many were the necessity to transform the SOE’s into privately held enterprises 
with the capability to compete efficiently. As early as 1988, legislators reflected on 
the possibility to incorporate antitrust principles into what would later become the 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law of 1993 (AUCL).16 Aside from a defined number of 
articles, the AUCL’s main attention was directed toward a miscellany of non-
antitrust issues, examples being unfair trade practices and prohibition of commercial 
bribery. 
 
The Company Law, effective as of 1994, was intentionally a tool to establish and 
keep property rights to be able to induce companies to compete effectively with the 
intended result of creating a competitive market structure.17 
 
Around 1993, a group of officials, from the SAIC and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC), sat down and analysed competition laws of other jurisdiction 
with the intent of creating a law with the principal goal to regulate antitrust issues. 
However, this first attempt to create an anti-monopoly law was shelved by the central 
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government, who feared the law would impede the growth of SOE’s, which were 
regarded the “key engines of economic development”.18 
Around this time, the government enacted the Price Law19, which outlaws price 
fixing, predatory pricing, “seeking exorbitant profits”, and price deception. The law 
also stated that the Chinese economy was in transition and that prices would be set 
by the market at large, whereas some still would be regulated by the government.20 
 
With China entering into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, a need to 
comply with the treaty sparked a legislative make over. The anti-monopoly law also 
came into focus, with the NPC Standing Committee stating that China would draft an 
antitrust law as part of its preparation for entry into the WTO.21 
 
In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), a 
predecessor of MOFCOM, implemented draft rules on the notice and approval 
process for concentrations involving foreign multinationals. These rules were partly 
based on earlier restrictions on foreign investment.22 The Provisional Merger and 
Acquisition Rules, setting up China’s first premerger notification and approval 
system, was promulgated by SAIC and MOFCOM in 2003. The provision had 
several reporting thresholds, amongst others; how many foreign invested enterprises 
(FIEs) that were controlled by the parties, market shares, assets and sales. Further, in 
June 2003, the NDRC promulgated Provisional Rules on the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Pricing Behaviours (NDRC Provisional Rules). This provision gave 
additional details to the provisions in the already existing Price Law, and also 
included some extensional regulations in the area of bidding, resale price 
maintenance, and numerous forms of price-related abuse of dominant position. The 
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provisional rules enacted revealed the importance of a law dedicated exclusively to 
antitrust matters.23 
 
Several drafts of the AML now emerged. The October 2002 Draft AML, prepared by 
the SETC, was reviewed by the State Council Legislative Affairs Office in 2003. It 
included provisions on abuse of market dominance, collusion amongst businesses, 
abuse of administrative power by government units, and the creation of an Anti-
Monopoly Management Body of the State Council. Some foreign critics expressed 
their concern with regards to the possible foreign-focused enforcement provisions in 
these early AML drafts.24 
 
The February 2004 Draft AML, expressed the need for a “competent Anti-Monopoly 
Authority under the Ministry of Commerce”.25 There were some discussions on 
which agencies should have the enforcement and policymaking competence under 
the law, which ended up in MOFCOM setting up its own Anti-Monopoly Office in 
September 2004.26 
 
The April 8, 2005 Draft AML formed the basis for an Anti-Monopoly Authority 
under the State Council. The newly formed authority was given extensive powers to 
implement and enforce the law.27 This draft was also the basis for a conference held 
in Beijing in May 2005, organized by the State Council Legislative Affairs Office 
(LAO). Among the attendants included high ranked academics and officials 
representing antitrust agencies from all over the world, as well as representatives 
from the American Bar Association (ABA) and other non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) like UNCTAD and OECD.28 An amended draft of the AML 
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was then released in July 2005. This draft was then revised by the State Council and 
submitted to the NPC in June 2006 for its review and approval. The draft went 
through three readings and some revisions. Most of the revisions reflected policy 
concerns of the government, especially regarding the protection of SOEs in the 
strategic sectors and national security concerns on acquisition of domestic enterprises 
by foreign investors.29 Because of the boom of foreign investment in the form of 
M&A that happened over the past decade, there were concerns that the foreign 
multinationals would strip the acquired firms of their capacity to independently 
develop technology and products, and become dominant in important Chinese 
industries. The original idea was that the foreign M&A of domestic firms would add 
their valuable knowledge and bring further development into the Chinese market, but 
what actually happened was that the already existing knowledge and new 
development was moved out of China. This development in the M&A sector of 
foreign investment became a huge problem. The promulgation of the AML thus 
became even more important, to secure valuable research and development, and to 
protect vital strategic sectors in China. The idea was also that a more transparent 
M&A regulatory mechanism would reduce uncertainties and benefit both Chinese 
and foreign parties in the long run.30 
 
Amendments were made to the AML right up until the time it was submitted for final 
voting. With regards to Chapter 4 of the AML, which focuses on concentrations, all 
changes made from the October 2002 Draft AML until the final version of the law, 
has helped align the regulations with international norms exemplified by the 




Section 2 Today’s Legal Structure of Anti-Monopoly Policy on 
M&A by Foreign Investors in China 
 
It is important to understand the policy behind the AML to be able to understand the 
reason behind the organization of the regulations. Since the late 1990s, foreign 
investors have been increasingly interested in merging with or acquiring domestic 
enterprises in China. M&A are key strategic ways to obtain immediate access to 
distribution channels, customer groups, or to achieve control of domestic enterprises 
with a prominent future. As a reaction to the fast growing foreign direct investment 
related M&A within the domestic market, China set up a notification and evaluation 
system in March 2003, by announcing the implementation of the Provisional Rules 
on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.32 The 
Provision was meant to “promote and regulate foreign investors’ investment in China 
and the introduction of advanced technology and management experiences from 
abroad, improve the utilization of foreign investment, rationalize the allocation of 
resources, ensure employment, and safeguard fair competition and national economic 
security”33. With this Provision, the government expressed their competition policy 
by stipulating in Article 3, that M&A “shall not create excessive concentration, 
eliminate or hinder competition, disturb social and economic order, or harm public 
interests”. 
 
In 2006, MOFCOM and five other government departments amended the 2003 
Provision. The 2006 Provision on Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises 
by Foreign Investors34, inter alia, added business transactions that lead to de facto 
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control of domestic enterprises in Article 12. Further, it required the merging parties 
to apply to the MOFCOM if the transaction resulted in control of a well-known or 
traditional trademark or brand name in China.35 
 
To facilitate the concerned parties to the Provision on Mergers and Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, MOFCOM, SASAC, SAT, SAIC, 
CSRC, and SAFE issued the Guide for the Anti-Monopoly Declaration for Foreign 
Investors’ Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises August 3rd, 2007. The 
guidelines states that the relevant market should include the geographic market 
dimension as well as the product market. The guidelines further stipulate that both 
parties also have to submit their own analysis of the competition in the relevant 
market when they apply for merger approval.36 
 
In 2009, as a consequence of the implementation of the AML, MOFCOM 
promulgated a revision of the Provisions on Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors.37 The amendment cancelled Chapter 5 about anti 
monopoly review, and made sure the Provision coincided with the AML and the 
Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Declaration of Concentrations of 
Undertakings.38 
 
The Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council also promulgated Guidelines of 
the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council on Defining Relevant Markets, 
May 24th, 2009. The purpose and basis of the Guidelines is to provide some clues as 
to what is to be defined in the term “relevant market”, and to increase transparency 
of work related to law enforcement by the AML enforcement authority of the State 
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Council.39 See later under chapter VI for a more detailed description of the term 
“relevant market”. 
 
Within a short period after the AML was effective, MOFCOM started the drafting of 
China’s Merger Guidelines. The big challenge was to create a set of rules that both 
complied with the foreign competition practices and the AML. The Interim 
Regulation on the Assessment of the Competition Effects of Concentrations of 
Undertakings under the Anti-Monopoly Law was promulgated August 29th, 2011. 
The Regulation shall provide instructions on the factors that should be considered in 
a merger review process, as well as MOFCOM’s interpretation of such factors.40 
 
With the further opening up policy of China, and the consequential huge amount of 
FDI inflow, there has been a growing sentiment of economic patriotism since around 
the mid 2000s. The rising concern over foreign firms attaining dominant, or 
monopoly positions, in Chinese industries were one of the driving forces behind the 
enactment of the AML.41 In short time after the enactment of the AML, an official 
from the State Council expressed China’s disapproval of “hostile foreign 
acquisitions” and those foreign acquisitions that harm its national economic 
security.42 A “hostile foreign acquisition” would be a foreign acquisition of a 
Chinese company that would harm the national economic security, by for example 
moving valuable technological knowledge out of China, or rising the barrier to entry 
in that specific market to such a level that it would be impossible for other competing 
companies to enter into it or to keep up the pace of the technological advancement 
and thus taking over the entire market in that valuable industry sector.43 
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China’s legal structure of anti-monopoly policy on M&A for foreign investors in 
China has evolved rapidly over the last decade, showing the governments ability to 
adapt and conform to a dynamic market. The AML is of course the most important 
enactment of the few mentioned, but the provisions, interims and guidelines play an 
important role in elaborating on crucial details essential to the understanding and 
implementation of the law in practice. 
 
Section 3 BIT’s Positive Effect on M&A Procedure 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT’s) are generally considered as “the most important 
legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign investment 
between developed and developing countries”.44 BITs are easy to implement, and are 
utilized extensively in the area of antitrust enforcement.45 
 
A BIT between two nations usually focuses on protecting the investors rights and 
imposing obligations on the host country. The parties may agree to terms such as 
most-favoured nation treatment, national treatment, interagency assistance and 
information sharing. Although these agreements do not alter domestic law, they will 
normally generate enhanced efficiency and transparency in the antitrust enforcement 
area. 
 
A BIT could not singularly constitute convergence, or prevent divergent merger 
review decisions due to the fact that the merger agencies in the different antitrust 
jurisdictions are subject to different legal systems and economic analysis.46 But 
because the BITs are relatively easy to develop and can improve antitrust law 
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enforcement, particularly where the antitrust agencies interact frequently, scholars 
argue that they are the most effective solution.47 Indeed, such treaties have obtained 
considerable success in facilitating convergence and adding efficiency to global 
merger enforcement. 
 
Due to the fact that BITs can not eliminate the threat of significant disagreement 
between nations, it is important to continue to work towards convergence, and not 
only engage in BITs, but also other arrangements like international treaties and soft 
law through multilateral networks. More than a hundred nations have their own 
competition law, and although BITs present a good starting point for cooperation and 
convergence, it will be in everyone’s best interest to maximize efficiency and 
minimize costs by unifying antitrust laws as much as possible keeping in mind the 














Chapter 2 Legal Forms of M&A under Chinese 
Foreign Investment Law 
 
Foreign investment in China has to take place in accordance with the relevant foreign 
investment laws promulgated by the Chinese government. The following companies 
are currently the most popular forms of foreign investment enterprises in China: 
 
1. Sino-foreign equity joint venture (EJV), 
2. Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture (CJV), 
3. Wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE), and 
4. Foreign-invested joint stock limited company (FISC). 
 
The common referral to all of these company structures is a foreign invested 
enterprise (FIE). A FIE is most often in the form of a limited liability company 
(LLC) in accordance with the P.R.C. Company Law. 
 
With regards to M&A of domestic companies by foreign investors, when the M&A 
deal is completed by the parties, the target company must be converted into a FIE, 
with the exception of the CJV. The CJV is sometimes referred to as a contractual 
joint venture, and is allowed to operate in a much more flexible manner than the rest 
of the FIEs. For instance, the CJV does not have to be a legal person, and so the 
parties may agree upon the liabilities when they formulate the contractual terms. All 
companies involved in M&A have to be legal persons under the Chinese law, and 
thus it excludes an acquired company from entering into the form of a CJV.48 
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Section 1 Direct and Indirect Acquisition 
 
Practice shows that international companies normally make direct investment in a 
foreign state in one out of two ways. Either they found a new enterprise, or they 
invest through M&A of a local enterprise. In China, foreign investors drastically 
speeded up their investment after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001,49 and there 
has been an inclination toward making the investment through M&A of domestic 
companies. 
 
M&A by foreign investors in China may be divided into two categories, depending 
on the status of the individual investor. The first is where the investor acquires the 
Chinese enterprise directly, and the second is where an already existing foreign 
invested enterprise (FIE) executes the M&A procedure. The first category is 
currently the dominant one, with its implementation measures further divided into: 
integral M&A, partial M&A, holding M&A and subscription M&A. 
 
• Integral M&A: According to Regulations to Guide Foreign Investment 
Directions, Chinese government authorize foreign investors acquiring 
Chinese companies that engage in business fields within the Encouraged 
Investment Fields stipulated by the Foreign Investment Guidance Catalogue. 
After the M&A process is complete the newly formed company shall be 
registered as a WFOE. 
• Partial M&A: Foreign parties may partially acquire Chinese companies in the 
fields of investment that are categorized as restricted by foreign investment 
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laws. Examples of such restrictions may be that the investment must happen 
as an EJV, or the Chinese party must be the holding party. The foreign 
investor can therefore only acquire a limited proportion of the shares or 
equities in the desired company. A Partial M&A is also addressed as a 
Holding M&A if  more proportion of shares are controlled by the foreign 
company. 
• M&A through Foreign-Invested Enterprises: A foreign-invested enterprise is 
defined as a Chinese legal person, and being a Chinese legal person the 
foreign-invested enterprise may undertake integral or partial M&A over the 
Chinese company in four ways. Firstly you may acquire foreign-invested 
enterprises or domestic enterprises, or their shares, through a contractual 
agreement. Second you may purchase shares or assets of domestic companies 
that are for public sale at property right exchange markets. Third you can 
convert your creditor rights into shares according to Chinese laws as well as 
contractual agreement. And finally you may purchase liquidated assets of 
insolvent or bankrupted domestic companies at some specific auction 
markets.50 
 
According to Article 1 of the Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, and the relevant provision of AML, it is 
important to safeguard the economic safety of China. The Chinese government will 
thus prevent foreign enterprises from merging with or acquiring domestic companies 
if the national economic interests will be impaired. This was one of the main driving 
forces behind the promulgation of the AML. The disquiet over foreign acquisitions 
of domestic enterprises and national economic security were explicitly mentioned by 
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the Judicial Committee of the National People’s Congress at the final readings of the 
draft AML in June 2007.51 Because of the AML all foreign direct investment through 
the form of M&A is now regulated, securing the national interests and healthy 
market economy, as well as guiding and communicating important knowledge to 
foreign investors, creating a more predictable investment environment. 
	  
Section 2 Asset Acquisition and Share Acquisition 
 
The Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors Article 2 stipulates that an M&A of a domestic company may 
legally happen through M&A of equity interests or M&A of assets in the target 
company. 
 
A share acquisition refers to a foreign investor’s acquisition of a local shareholders 
equity in a company other than a FIE, or a foreign investor’s contribution to a 
domestic company’s capital increase, resulting in the conversion of the domestic 
company into a FIE. 
 
An asset acquisition refers to a foreign investor’s establishment of a FIE and the 
purchase through that FIE a domestic company’s asset and the operation of such 
assets, or a foreign investor’s acquisition of a domestic company’s assets to invest in 
and establish a FIE to operate the acquired assets. 
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Choice of investment method determine certain significant effects relating to legal 
status, absorption of risk, and registration procedure according to the Provisional 
Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors. 
 
In accordance with Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors Article 13, in the event of a share acquisition the 
FIE established shall succeed to the creditor’s rights and debts of the merged and 
acquired domestic company. In the event of an asset acquisition the domestic 
company that sold the assets will bear its existing rights and debts. 
 
A share acquisition will directly convert the company into a FIE. If the proportional 
ratio of the foreign capital contribution is more than 25 percent of the registered 
capital of the domestic company the FIE is entitled to the treatment of FIEs 
according to Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises 
by Foreign Investors Article 9. 
 
An asset acquisition will not automatically change the legal status of the acquired 
company. Usually the main purpose of an asset acquisition is to form a new 
company, transferring the domestic companies assets over to the new company. Even 
though asset acquisition and share acquisition is distinctly different in method, the 






Chapter 3 Process and Requirements of Anti-
Monopoly Review on Foreign M&A 
	  
Section 1 Starting the Merger Process 
 
When two companies agree to merge or acquire, and they reach the merger review 
thresholds set by the Chinese government, they have to file a merger notification 
according to the regulations before they implement the proposed transaction. The 
AML Article 21 stipulates that when the intended concentration reaches the 
threshold levels set by the State Council, the undertakings have to declare the 
concentration in advance of the concentration. They are not allowed to implement 
the concentration in the absence of such declaration. AML Article 25 further states 
that the concentration may not take place before the MOFCOM has made the 
decision not to conduct additional review of the concentration. And finally AML 
Article 26 stresses that where the MOFCOM conducts additional review of the 
concentration the parties may not conclude the concentration in the absence of an 
approval of the M&A. If the government fails to conduct the review within the time 
limit from 30 days in Article 25, and up to the maximum of 150 days in Articles 26, 
the undertakings may implement the concentration. There may be some lack of 
clarity as to what the companies can actually do to prepare the actual execution of 
the merger or acquisition agreement during the approval process. 
 
As in China the European competition laws stipulate that the transaction in itself 
must not be completed before the approval from the Commission. However, the 
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restriction is described further; prior to approval of the M&A by the Commission the 
parties shall act as independent economic entities, and thus refrain from integrating 
their businesses or be involved in each other’s day-to-day activities. The companies 
may however perform a due diligence for valuation and audit purposes and the 
parties may start the planning of the integration, but this must be performed strictly 
according to appropriate non-disclosure agreements. 
 
Section 2 The Scope of China’s Anti-Monopoly Review 
	  
I Concentration 
Chapter four in the AML addresses M&A procedure and is named “Concentration of 
Undertakings” which can be deemed as general scope of anti-monopoly. Article 20 
further defines “concentration” subject to merger control as:  
 
mergers; gaining control over another undertaking through the acquisition of shares 
or assets; and obtaining the control or the capacity to exercise decisive influence over 
another undertaking by signing contracts or other means. 
 
According to Article 21 the undertakings have to file a notification to MOFCOM if 
the concentration reaches the threshold levels set by the State Council. The 
notification has to happen in advance of the implementation of the concentration, and 
the parties may not close the transaction without prior notification and approval.52 
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II Deviation from the standard for internal group consolidations 
As stipulated in Article 22 notification is not necessary for internal group 
consolidations in which one undertaking owns more than 50 percent of the voting 
shares or assets of every other undertaking involved in the concentration. This means 
that related entities under common control will be treated as a single entity for the 
purpose of merger control. 
 
III Definition of control 
Article 20 in the AML does not define the word control as used in its subsections 2 
and 3. MOFCOM attempted to propose a definition in a previous draft of rules 
governing merger notifications that was sent out for public comment in January 
2009.53 The definition was later removed from the enacted rules issued in 2009. 
However, the draft rules stated that control could be defined as: 
• acquiring further than fifty percent of the voting shares or assets of another 
undertaking, or 
• acquiring the ability through any way, including by written contract, to select 
the appointment of one or more members of the board of directors and to 
make key management, operation and sales, financial budget, major 
investment, pricing as well as taking other important management and 
operation decisions of another undertaking. 
 
Because the foresaid draft of rules did not come into effect, the definition may at best 
act as a hint or guidance of what the authority define as “control”. It is however 
important to be aware over the fact that the removal of the definition means that the 
understanding expressed could be somewhat wrong. 
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The absence of clarification of the term means that several aspects of the M&A 
process remain uncertain, thus providing the involved parties and MOFCOM a 
considerable discretion in deciding the outcome of each M&A review case. 
 
IV Joint Ventures 
The AML does not specifically address joint ventures. However, in the draft 
Notification Rules circulated by MOFCOM in January 200954 it is confirmed that the 
"joint establishment" of a "new entity" by two or more entities forms a concentration 
under Article 20 of the AML. The language was removed from the final version, but 
it is informally expressed by MOFCOM that the creation of completely new joint 
ventures does constitute acquisition of control by contract or other means, not taking 
into concern the scope or structure of the joint venture. Also, MOFCOM has used 
Article 20 to embody changes in control of already existing joint ventures, including 
where one of the parties only achieves joint control.55 Finally, on November 10th, 
2011, MOFCOM conditionally cleared an establishment of a joint venture between 
GE (China) Co. Ltd. and China Shenhua Coal Liquefaction Chemical Co. Ltd.56 The 
decision confirmed that the establishment of joint ventures is subject to the AML 
merger review regime as long as the notification thresholds are met. 
 
Section 3 Mandatory Anti-Monopoly Review Thresholds 
 
You do not find the reporting thresholds in the AML, instead the thresholds are set 
by the State Council in accordance with AML Article 21, which are reflected as the 
scope of anti-monopoly review in details. When drafting the AML it was found that 
33	  
it would be better to not include such thresholds in the law, but to rather implement 
them as a lower level regulation so it would be easier to adjust them according to the 
dynamic economic development.57 The State Council adopted the Regulation of the 
State Council on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings 
(Regulation on Declaration Thresholds) on August 1st, 2008.58 
 
The Regulation on Declaration Thresholds requires prior notification with the 
competent commerce department of the State Council of any M&A meeting one of 
the following thresholds: 
 
• The combined worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned in 
the preceding financial year exceeds RMB 10 billion, and the nationwide 
turnover within China of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned in the preceding financial year exceeds RMB 400 million; or 
• The combined nationwide turnover within China of all the undertakings 
concerned in the preceding financial year exceeds RMB 2 billion, and the 
nationwide turnover within China of each of at least two of the 
undertakings concerned in the preceding financial year exceeds RMB 400 
million.59 
 
The thresholds set by the State Council is in consistency with the recommendations 
given by the International Competition Network (ICN).60 
 
In accordance with the Regulation on Declaration Thresholds, MOFCOM may 
initiate investigations into M&A transactions not meeting the above-mentioned 
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thresholds even if “facts and evidence collected pursuant to the prescribed procedure 
show that the said concentration has or might have the effect of excluding or 
restricting competition”. The wording chosen in Article 4 of the Regulation on 
Declaration Thresholds makes it clear that the discretion given to MOFCOM is 
extensive, as the investigation may be based on the concentration “might” having an 
effect on the competition in the market. 
 
The MOFCOM Review Measures61 Article 16 opens up for the M&A parties 
themselves to voluntarily submit a declaration for review in the case the M&A does 
not fulfil the thresholds mentioned above. 
 
The focus on sales turn-over in the review thresholds set by the State Council, was 
chosen as a measure because it is “objective, clear, and convenient for operators and 
the AMEAs to determine,” it “reflects an important indicator of economic strength,” 
and “most countries in the world use this indicator to determine reporting standards 
for business concentrations”.62 Through these thresholds the State Council attempts 
to find a balance between underreporting of transactions that may have impact on the 
Chinese market, and overburdening both parties and the MOFCOM reviewers.63 To 
facilitate the increasing amount of notifications, there are plans to introduce a 
simplified M&A review procedure for declarations that concerns simple relevant 
markets and small market shares.64 A draft Interim Measure on Simplified Merger 
Review Procedures, is currently being discussed according to MOFCOM.65 
 
To calculate the accordant turnover relevant for the review, MOFCOM accumulate 
group-wide turnover across all related entities under common control (excluding 
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internal sales) and calculates turnover of all products (not only those involved in the 
proposed transaction).66 
 
The MOFCOM Notification Rules67, together with the Rules for Calculation of 
Turnover for the Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings in the Financial 
Sector68, provided some clarification on some important terms69: 
 
• “Turnover” is defined to include the income by the relevant business 
operator from the sales of products or provision of services after 
deduction of taxes and surcharges. 
• All sales to purchasers located in China are considered to be China sales. 














Section 4 The Review Process 
 
The review process has several stages, and are explained in the AML: 
 
• If the M&A parties meet the thresholds described in the State Council’s 
Regulation on Declaration Thresholds70, the parties must submit a filing 
to MOFCOM prior to implementation of the concentration.71 
• According to AML Article 25 when the filing is submitted, MOFCOM 
performs a “preliminary review” within thirty days and determines 
whether further review is necessary. 
• If MOFCOM finds that further review is necessary, it shall complete such 
review within ninety days. Under certain circumstances the ninety days 
review period may be extended with sixty days. At the end of this review 
period a decision on whether or not to prohibit the concentration must be 
made.72 
 
The initial review period starts when the M&A parties have submitted all relevant 
documentation mentioned in AML Article 23. The documentation needed is 
extensive, and the preliminary review period does not commence until the 
documentation is complete and satisfactory.73 Only when MOFCOM has formally 
accepted the filing the thirty days review period starts running.74 Because the AML 
requires submission of “other documents and materials as specified by AMEA”,75 
MOFCOM may in fact contravene the commencement of the thirty days preliminary 




Where the undertakings fail to declare or file the concentration to MOFCOM, and 
the concentration meets the threshold levels set by the State Council, it will not be 
able to complete the concentration, according to AML Article 21. 
 
I Filing 
The AML does not determine which of the M&A parties that has to file the merger 
notification. However, the MOFCOM Notification Rules76 Article 9 stipulates that 
where the concentration is formed by way of merger, all the parties involved have to 
file a notification. If the concentration is formed by one party acquiring another 
party, the party acquiring control shall file the notification. No filing fee is currently 
required. 
 
The parties have to file the notification before they implement the concentration.77 
However, according to MOFCOM Notification Rules Article 10, MOFCOM 
demands executed transaction documents before it will deem the filing complete. 
Thus, the earliest time possible to submit the filing is subsequent to the execution of 
the transaction documents. 
 
The “pre-acceptance phase” may take weeks or months, depending on how 
complicated the case is, MOFCOM schedule, and other factors. MOFCOM also may 
have several requests for additional information from both the involved parties, and 




The acceptance of a filing does not have to be published. MOFCOM commonly 
notifies the parties involved when the filing is accepted as complete. 
 
If the parties have failed to declare the completed M&A transaction the parties will 
be subject to sanctions, including fines, required disposal of shares and assets, and 
reversal of the transaction.78 
 
II Initial review 
Once the filing is accepted as complete, the initial review period commences. The 
period may last up to thirty days.79 
 
During the initial review period MOFCOM investigates the proposed M&A. The 
investigation can be quite extensive, and includes contacting and requesting 
information from customers, competitors, the parties themselves, suppliers, and other 
government agencies. They may also conduct hearings with the relevant parties 
according to the MOFCOM Review Measures80 Articles 7 and 8. 
 
If MOFCOM finds reasons to believe there are competitive concerns with regard to 
the transaction in the course of the review period, they will inform the parties, which 
in turn have to address the concerns with evidence.81 
 
When the thirty days preliminary review period is completed, MOFCOM has to 
either approve the M&A transaction or initiate further review. MOFCOM has to 
inform the parties of their decision in writing.82 
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III Second stage review 
If MOFCOM finds that the transaction needs additional investigation they can 
initiate a further review period of up to ninety days, according to AML Article 26. 
The parties shall be notified in writing of the decision.83 Such decisions do not have 
to be publicized. The parties may not implement the concentration during the second 
stage review period.84 
 
In the case of an exceptionally extensive M&A transaction there could be a need for 
an extension in the ninety days review period. In those rare cases the AML Article 26 
has opened for an addition of sixty days to the review period, also referred to as 
“phase 3”. The addition to the review period is however subject to the following 
conditions: 
 
1. The undertakings agree to the extension; 
2. The materials submitted by the undertakings are inaccurate and need further 
verification; or 
3. Major changes have taken place after the undertakings made the declaration. 
 
MOFCOM has to make a decision within the time limit. If they fail to do so, the 
M&A transaction parties may implement the transaction. 
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Section 5 Detailed Information Requirements 
 
I Merger declaration 
To declare an M&A transaction the involved parties has to submit certain documents 
as stipulated in Article 23 of the AML. These documents includes:  
 
• a written declaration with the names of the undertakings involved, their 
domiciles, business scopes, the anticipation date for the concentration, 
and “other matters specified by the authority for enforcement of the 
(MOFCOM)”; 
• the concentration agreement; 
• declaration in writing; 
• an explanation of the impact to be exerted by the concentration on 
competition in a relevant market; 
• the financial and accounting reports of the undertakings involved for the 
previous accounting year that is audited by an accounting firm; and 
• other documents and materials as specified by MOFCOM. 
 
In the MOFCOM Notification Rules85 Article 10, you find more details on the 
current practice with regards to the declaration documents: 
 
• the written declaration have to specify the names, addresses and scopes of 
operation of the business operators involved in the concentration. The 
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declaring parties have to submit their business licenses and incorporation 
certificates. If the declaring party is a foreign entity they will have to 
notarize and certify their certificates; 
• the parties need a description of and information about the impact the 
concentration will have on the conditions of market competition. More 
specifically the information shall include the following: 
o an overview of the transaction; 
o a definition of the relevant markets; 
o the market shares the parties hold in the relevant markets, and 
their control of those markets; 
o key competitors and their market shares; 
o market concentration; 
o market access; 
o current industry development; 
o the impact of the concentration on the structure of market 
competition, industry development, technological advances, 
national economic growth, consumers, and other business 
operators; and 
o the assessment and basis of the impact of the concentration on 
relevant market competition. 
• financial and accounting reports of the parties involved in the transaction 
for the preceding accounting year that is audited by an accounting firm. 
• concentration agreements and relevant documents, which include 
specifically all types of M&A agreement documents, such as agreements, 
contracts and corresponding supplementary documents. 
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• Other documents and information to be submitted as required by 
MOFCOM. 
 
With regards to the demand for all of the concentration agreements, there have been 
some concerns relating to unveiling confidential business information and 
arrangements from the notifying parties. It seems however, that the matter has been 
settled in favour of full information disclosure in accordance with the MOFCOM 
Notification Rules86 The MOFCOM is, however, bound by strict confidentiality, and 
any violations are bound by strict penalties. 
 
The transaction parties may also add other information on voluntary basis to assist 
MOFCOM in their decision, according to MOFCOM Notification Rules Article 11. 
 
The MOFCOM Notification Rules Article 12 further stipulates that all the 
documentation handed in related to the declaration have to be in Chinese. In case the 
main documents are in a different language they have to be translated into Chinese 
and be admitted with the original. Some foreign observers have commented on this 
matter and expressed the view that some of the documentation requirements are 
overly complex and costly.87 However, the parties may be permitted to submit a 
Chinese summary of the documents. In the global concentration notification 
community it is not unusual to demand translations of notification declaration 
documents, one example being the U.S. where the parties have to submit English 
summaries or translation together with the foreign language documents.88 Under EU 
Law, the notification materials have to be in one of the twenty official languages of 
the European Community.89 
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As already mentioned, MOFCOM is bound by strict confidentiality boundaries when 
reviewing and assessing M&A declarations. This is also stipulated in the AML 
Articles 41, stating: “The authority for enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law and 
its staff members are obligated to keep confidential the commercial secrets they 
come to have access to in the course of law enforcement.” In the case of violation the 
AML poses strict sanctions in Article 54. 
 
There have been no indications to date that MOFCOM has ever failed to maintain the 




There are no official regulation or information of what is deemed as relevant 
information under the subsequent phases of MOFCOM’s review process for the 
investigation. It is however clear from both issued and draft regulations, and from the 
published decisions, that MOFCOM requires extensive information from the M&A 
parties and from other involved parties.90 
 
III Third parties 
According to the MOFCOM Review Measures Article 6,91 the MOFCOM may 
solicit organizational or individual opinions from relevant government authorities, 
trade associations, consumers and business operators when necessary. These parties 
may also request MOFCOM to convene a hearing, and to obtain information and 
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hear opinions. This means that any of these third parties may submit information that 
























Section 6 Substantive Standards 
	  
I AML Article 28 
The predominant substantive test with regards to Chinese merger review is found in 
AML Article 28 which stipulates that “If the concentration of undertakings lead, or 
may lead, to elimination or restriction of competition, the authority for enforcement 
of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council shall make a decision to prohibit 
their concentration.” There is not any guidance on interpretation of “elimination or 
restriction” in the law, or in any other regulations to date. Further, Article 28 does 
not give any concrete requirements with regards of the degree of restriction that has 
to be reached, which means that any restriction of competition in the market may 
lead to the concentration being prohibited. However, if it is found that the 
concentration leads to elimination or restriction of competition in the relevant 
market, Article 28 gives MOFCOM the discretion to still allow the concentration if 
the advantage of such a concentration outweighs the disadvantages, or the 
concentration is in the public interest. 
 
II Relevant markets and market definition 
The reference to the relevant markets is found in AML Articles 23 and 27, which 
states that the undertaking has to submit an explanation of the impact to be exerted 
by the concentration on competition in the relevant market, and that MOFCOM has 
to take into consideration the market shares of the undertakings involved in the 
concentration in a relevant market, their power of control over the market, and the 




There is a definition of “relevant market” in the AML Article 12, stipulating that 
“relevant market” consist of the range of the commodities for which, and the regions 
where, undertakings compete each other during a given period of time for specific 
commodities or services. Because the “relevant market” definition is so important 
with regards to the review process, the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State 
Council also promulgated the Market Definition Guidelines93 to make the term as 
palpable as possible. The Market Definition Guidelines applies equally to monopoly 
agreements, abuses of dominance and the merger review process. 
 
According to Article 7 of the Market Definition Guidelines there is no exclusive 
method for defining a relevant market. There are however listed several factors 
which have to be taken into account with the actual situation when assessing each 
and every case. Article 3 of the Market Definition Guidelines stipulates that a 
relevant market shall mean the product scope or the geographical scope within which 
an operator participates in competition during a certain period of time with respect to 
a specific product or service. 
 
The product scope refers to the relevant product market, which means a “market 
comprising of a group or a category of products which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by consumers by reason of the products’ 
characteristics, their intended use and their price.”94 
 
The geographical scope refers to the relevant geographic market, which means “a 
geographical area where consumers obtain products that are interchangeable or 
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substitutable.”95 In other words, the relevant geographic area is the area within which 
the companies compete with each other. 
 
Because products regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by consumers, or 
geographical areas where such products are provided, constitutes direct and effective 
competitive constraint on operators’ acts in the market competition, the definition of 
a relevant market shall mainly be based on the consumers’ demand analysis.96 This 
means that the degree in which the consumers have an option with regards to choice 
of products is most important for the relevant market analysis. The Guidelines 
reference the “smallest market principle”, defining the narrowest range of products 
or geographic area that represent possible significant anticompetitive effects in the 
context of considering the “hypothetical monopolist” or “small but significant and 
non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP) test.97 This method has also been used in 
the U.S. market, stipulated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines98 § 1.11. In the 
European market the SSNIP test was first applied in the Nestlé/Perrier case in 1992, 
and was later recognized by the European Commission in 1997, through the 
Commission's Notice for the Definition of the Relevant Market. 
 
It is somewhat difficult to determine exactly what MOFCOM’s decisions are built 
upon. The cases mentioned in part f. iii. of this thesis may however give some ideas 
as to what is decisive to determine the relevant market definition. In the earliest case 
mentioned, InBev, the market was understood as the “Chinese beer market”, with no 
further interpretation of the term. In another case, the Coca Cola decision, 
MOFCOM discussed the competitive effects of proposed transaction in relation to 
both the juice beverage market and the carbonated soft drinks market, without any 
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further discussion on the definition of the product market and the consideration of 
the percentage of natural juice in the carbonated soft drinks. In Lucite, it seems that 
many chemicals produced by the transaction parties, including MMA, were defined 
as separate product markets. In Pfizer, a specific animal vaccine was defined as a 
separate relevant market, there was however overlaps in at least one other animal 
health product and two drugs for humans. In Panasonic, three different types of 
batteries were considered to be in different product markets. And, in Seagate 
MOFCOM regarded the product market to be the hard disk drive (HDD) market. It 
was easy for the PC manufacturers to switch between suppliers, because the HDD 
products were homogeneous and the market transparent. 
 
With regards to the geographical market definition there has, according to the 
published decisions, been a focus on China as being the relevant geographical market 
without any further analysis, examples being InBev, Coca Cola, and Lucite. In Pfizer 
MOFCOM was more precise, concluding that mainland China was the geographical 
market, thus excluding Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. The market for the products 
in Panasonic and Seagate was defined as world-wide. 
 
In accordance with AML Article 23 the M&A parties has to provide documents and 
materials that defines the relevant markets, this includes definitions on both China-
wide and world wide markets. 
 
The Chinese application of “relevant market” is much the same as in Europe and in 




III Anti-monopoly Law Article 27, and MOFCOM decisions 
According to AML Article 27 the following criterions should be taken into 
consideration in the review of concentration of undertakings: 
 
• the market shares of the undertakings involved in a relevant market and their 
power of control over the market; 
• the degree of concentration in the relevant market; 
• the impact of their concentration on access to the market and technological 
advance; 
• the impact of their concentration on consumers and the other relevant 
undertakings concerned; 
• the impact of their concentration on the development of the national 
economy; and 
• other factors affecting market competition as deemed necessary by 
MOFCOM. 
 
These criterions will act as requirements for the anti-monopoly review, and may 
therefore give some guidance as to what information should be disclosed to an M&A 
declaration to MOFCOM. 
 
Some of these factors address issues that are not related to the evaluation of 
competitive effects from the M&A, and are not conventional parts of merger analysis 
in other leading antitrust jurisdictions. In particular the effect of the M&A on “other 
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undertakings” or “the development of the national economy” are factors that are not 
typically a part of leading antitrust jurisdictions M&A review. 
 
It is somewhat difficult to analyse MOFCOM’s review process full out. Only a part 
of the M&A cases declared are completely published, and the ones being published 
are rather conclusive in nature. However, it is to some degree possible to evaluate the 
decisions that have been published. There are seventeen cases published to date, of 
which one was denied and the rest conditionally approved. Where the MOFCOM 
finds that a concentration may have negative impact on the competitive market they 
have the option to allow such concentration with conditions, as stipulated in AML 
Article 29. The restrictive conditions imposed shall eliminate the negative effects 
found to be the result of the concentration. 
 
The MOFCOM decisions appear to consider factors consistent with AML Article 27, 
as well as with those considered by other jurisdictions merger review systems. 
MOFCOM’s published judgements does not give an in-depth analysis of the criteria 
in Article 27 used on the facts of each case, and that makes it difficult to affirm the 
key deciding factors of each decision. But as more decisions are being published and 
analysed, we may start to draw some lines, and understand the connection, between 
the conclusions and the decisive factors that settles the fate of an M&A agreement. 
The predictability this creates may contribute to a more foreseeable and cost efficient 
process for companies contemplating an M&A. 
 
The seventeen cases published to date is: InBev100, Delphi101, Pfizer102, Panasonic103, 
Lucite104, Coca-Cola105, Novartis106, Silvinit107, Savio108, Shenhua109, Seagate110, 
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Henkel111, Western Digital112, Google113, Goodrich114, Wal-Mart115 and Gemalto116. I 
have included a summary of a selected number of the decisions in this thesis, in order 
to form an overall impression of the factors decisive for the result in the Chinese 
merger review system. 
 
InBev117 
MOFCOM’s merger decision on the acquisition of American brewer Anheuser-
Busch by Belgian-Brazilian brewer InBev was the first decision to be published in 
China. The acquisition of the American company was approved after imposing 
several conditions due to each of the foreign companies’ ownership in the Chinese 
breweries Tsingtao Beer and Zhujiang Brewery Group. One of the conditions was a 
constraint, blocking InBev from acquiring additional shares in the domestic 
competitors. The announcement of the decision was only a short page, and there is 
not much of an analysis to study. However, a MOFCOM press release revealed some 
further details: “the results of the review show that this transaction does not result in 
eliminating or restricting effect on competition in the beer market in China; therefore 
MOFCOM decided not to prohibit the transaction. However, in order to prevent the 
formation of a structure that impairs competition after the transaction, MOFCOM 
imposed necessary restrictive conditions.”118 The press release showed that 
MOFCOM had deliberated on the terms in Article 27, and reviewed the competitive 







On August 18th, 2009, the American corporation General Motors Limited (GM) 
applied to declare its acquisition of the American company Delphi Corporation 
(Delphi). MOFCOM published its conditional approval on November 28th, 2009.  
The decision considers the vertical effects of the transaction and raised a number of 
foreclosure-related concerns, including: whether Delphi would continue to supply 
parts to domestic automobile “original equipment manufacturer” (OEM) competitors 
of GM, whether Delphi could delay or prevent domestic automobile OEM 
competitors from switching to other automotive parts suppliers, whether GM would 
have access to confidential information in Delphi’s possession relating to domestic 
automobile OEM competitors, and whether GM would purchase from competing 
domestic automobile parts suppliers post-merger. The result was conditions on the 
mentioned concerns, to prevent discrimination by Delphi/GM against its competitors. 
 
Pfizer120 
The conditioned approval of the American owned pharmaceutical company Pfizer’s 
acquisition of American owned Wyeth was announced September 29th, 2009. Several 
products were evaluated, but the only product with a danger of restricting 
competition in that specific market within China was the swine mycoplasma 
pneumonia vaccine. Compared to InBev, this decision is much more detailed and 
reasoned. Inter alia, it specifies that the geographical market, referred to as China, 
exclude Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. MOFCOM also concluded that the merged 
company, due to its market share, would be able to “expand its market by virtue of 
its market scale, and would thereby control market prices.” MOFCOM found that the 
barriers to entry were high. Further, Pfizer would be able to expand its China market 
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and marginalize other competitors by taking advantage of its magnitude, while 
restricting the development of other competitors in the same field. 
 
The main condition for the planned acquisition was a divestiture of Pfizer’s business 
in swine mycoplasma pneumonia vaccine in China. 
 
Panasonic121 
January 21st, 2009, MOFCOM received the notification of the Japanese company 
Panasonic’s acquisition of Sanyo, a Japanese electric enterprise. The declaration was 
approved with conditions, due to the conclusion that the merger would limit the 
effect of competition in the product markets for lithium coin-cell secondary batteries, 
consumer nickel-metal hydride batteries (NiMH) and automobile NiMH batteries. 
 
For the lithium coin-cell secondary batteries the concern was that the market for such 
batteries is highly concentrated. The merger between Panasonic and Sanyo would 
result in a 61.6 percent market share, and so the merger would restrict the 
purchaser’s right to choose between products and limit sources of supply, which 
would ensure continuity. The merger would enable the transaction parties to raise 
prices post-merger. The buyer power did not offset these concerns because many 
small and medium-sized buyers lacked such power. 
 
With concern to the consumer NiMH batteries the parties would achieve a market-
leading share by merging. This would enable the parties to increase the prices 
unilaterally. Further, the device manufacturers, principal buyers and distributors of 
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such batteries often require their purchasers to commit to one specific brand of 
battery, which excludes other competitors. 
 
Panasonic’s joint venture with Toyota already had a leading position with the 
concern of automobile NiMH batteries, with a market share of 77 percent. The only 
other competitor in this market was Sanyo. Therefore the merger with Sanyo would 
eliminate all other competition in this product market. MOFCOM thus required the 
parties to divestiture overlapping businesses in China and Japan, and Panasonic to 
reduce its stake in Toyota. 
 
The requirement to divestiture Panasonics business in Japan is the first requirement 
that is of extraterritorial character, and demonstrates a development in MOFCOM’s 
merger enforcement. The decisions are correspondingly growing more detailed and 
display an offensive approach to merger enforcement.  
 
Coca-Cola122 
On November 20th, 2008, MOFCOM accepted the merger filing of Coca-Cola’s 
acquisition of Huiyuan, a Chinese beverage enterprise. The merger was subsequently 
denied by MOFCOM due to three principal anticompetitive effects. Firstly, acquiring 
Huiyuan would give Coca-Cola the power to not only dominate the carbonated soft 
drinks market, but to transfer this dominance into the juice beverage market. 
Secondly, adding the famous Huiyuan brand to Coca-Cola’s portfolio of brands, 
when already holding the strong Minute Maid brand and dominating the soft drinks 
market would raise barriers to enter the market for other possible competitors in the 
juice beverage market. Thirdly, the transaction would damage small and medium-
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sized domestic juice manufacturers, hinder local manufacturers from competing, and 
impair innovation. 
 
The protection of small and medium-sized competitors seems to have been an 
objective when deciding upon the merger declaration, as does industrial policy 
considerations.123 These considerations are characteristic to China’s merger review 
system. China is still a developing country, and the market economy is still at an 
early stage of its commencement. Some observers may suggest that the deviation 
from international rules and practice may be originated in MOFCOM’s lack of 
knowledge compared to the more evolved merger review systems. It is however 
more likely that the special adaptions made in the Chinese antitrust regime are 
necessary to facilitate the special circumstances of a country that just some decades 
ago started implementing a market economy. In order to build a healthy market 
economy, with competitors that are able to compete on the same terms, China has 
imposed some necessary measures to guarantee fair play on its own behalf. It may 
not be popular to foreign investors with the singular intention of making profit, but 
as China has not implemented a full-on market economy, but a “market economy 
with socialist characteristics”, it should be obvious that the Chinese antitrust system 
will somewhat deviate from the more evolved antitrust regimes. 
 
The Coca-Cola decision did not indicate which party has the burden to prove 
dominant position and anticompetitive effect, although it seems clear that it lays with 
the transaction parties to refute MOFCOM’s theory of harm to competition post-
merger. In this merger decision Coca-Cola did not manage to rebut MOFCOM’s 
theory of harm, neither did Coca-Cola manage to accommodate the theory with 
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MOFCOM conditionally cleared the establishment of a joint venture between 
General Electric China (GE) and China Shenhua Coal Liquefaction Chemical 
(Shenhua) on November 10th, 2011. The decision marks the first time a Chinese 
entity has been subject to corrective measures under the AML. The declaration is 
also the first to confirm that joint ventures are subject to the AML merger review 
regime. 
 
MOFCOM found that GE is one out of three owners of coal-water slurry gasification 
(CWSG) technology in China, and holds the highest market share in the relevant 
market. Shenhua’s parent company is the biggest supplier of raw coal suitable for the 
CWSG technology in China. This raised the concern that the entity would control the 
supply of raw coal by taking advantage of Shenhua’s dominant position in the 
market for raw coal, and limit competition in the market for CWSG technology post-
merger. 
 
To impede unwanted consequences MOFCOM requested that the parties commit to 
not constrain their competitors to use the joint venture’s CWSG technology or 
increase the expenses for competitors that wishes to use a different technology by 





MOFCOM conditionally cleared the American data storage company Seagate’s 
acquisition of the South Korean enterprise Samsung’s HDD business on December 
12th, 2011. The decision is relatively elaborative compared to earlier decisions 
published by MOFCOM, and shows a positive development towards an increased 
transparency with regards to the published decisions. 
 
After thorough investigations MOFCOM found that the HDD market is highly 
concentrated and that the level of concentration has grown over the last couple of 
decades. At the time of investigation there were five HDD manufacturers in the 
global market, of which Seagate and Samsung held 33 and 10 percent of the market 
share respectively. Similar market shares were said to exist in the Chinese HDD 
market. MOFCOM concluded that the main customers of HDD products are large 
PC manufacturers and that it takes a small effort to change suppliers. To continue 
this healthy competitive situation it was found necessary to maintain this 
procurement pattern in the market. 
 
MOFCOM found it was very difficult to enter the HDD market because of 
intellectual property rights and innovation. 
 
MOFCOM concluded that the transaction would eliminate an important competitor 
in the market, resulting in disadvantageous conditions for the consumer. Due to the 
transparency in the market, and the subsequent possibility to predict competitors’ 
behaviour, the merger would let the remaining competitors exploit the situation by 
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securing orders simultaneously and as a result decrease the competitive constraints 
imposed by the procurement pattern in the market. 
 
To restrain the unwanted negative effects on the market, MOFCOM imposed several 
conditions on the parties. Seagate had to take measures to secure Samsung’s brand as 
an independent competitor. This included not sharing sensitive information, and 
establishing independent sales team. Both parties had to fulfil their commitments to 
keep and expand Samsung’s production capacity within six months, and thereafter 
justly determine the production capacity of Samsung’s products by evaluating the 
demand and supply conditions in the market. After completion of the merger, 
Seagate should not force customers to purchase HDD products from Seagate, or 
change its business patterns. Further, Seagate was not to force TDK Investment Ltd. 
to supply HDD magnetic heads exclusively to Seagate, or restrict the supply of HDD 
magnetic heads to other HDD competitors. Seagate would also commit to spending 
800,000 USD over a period of three years on R&D funding.126 
 
Google127 
On May 19th, 2012, MOFCOM published its conditional approval of Google’s 
acquisition of the American enterprise Motorola Mobility (Motorola). MOFCOM’s 
approval of the deal was the last hinder for the implementation of the USD 12.5 
billion vertical deal. 
 
MOFCOM defined the relevant product markets as: 1. smart mobile devices, and 2. 
smart mobile device operating systems (OSs). It was found that the competitive 
conditions in the two different markets were incomparable. Whereas the market for 
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smart mobile devices was fragmented, competitive, innovative and dynamic, the 
market for smart mobile device OSs was highly concentrated and had high barriers 
of entry. 
 
MOFCOM found that the Google owned Android smart mobile device OS held a 
dominant market position with its 73.99 percent market share in China. Due to 
Android’s free and open source strategy it has achieved a dominant market position 
within a short period of time. Because the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
in a large scale has based their production to suit the free and available Android OSs, 
there has become a dependency on this OS. MOFCOM concluded that a requirement 
for approval would be that the new entity continued its free and open source strategy 
to secure the survival of many OEMs. 
 
Further, Google would post-merger have the incentive and possibility to give 
Motorola favourable treatment and impose unreasonable patent licensing terms and 
conditions to other OEMs, hinder competition and in that way damage consumer 
interests. 
 
MOFCOM imposed several remedies to enable approval of the acquisition. Firstly, 
Google had to continue to keep the Android OS free of charge and an open-source 
for at least five years. Secondly, Google should not discriminate any other OEMs for 
five years. Thirdly, Google should honour Motorola’s existing commitment to 





China is a nascent antitrust jurisdiction. However, they have demonstrated a 
considerable advancement in the few years of enforcement. There is still room for 
improvement, especially with the concern of transparency with regards to published 
declarations. But taken into consideration the development from MOFCOM’s first 
published decision, InBev, to some of the later published decisions, Seagate and 
Google, and the continuing endeavour to clarify the regulations and processes of the 
AML and merger review, there is evidently a strong will to create an open, functional 
and efficient system for all parties concerned. It is essential to focus on this matter. 
Not only is it important to keep foreign investors interested in investing their capital 
in China, but also to manage with MOFCOM’s enforcement capacity constraints and 
the pressure of balancing the objectives of the AML to protect competition on one 
side, and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy on the 
other side. 
 
Viewing the seventeen decisions published to this point, we can see that:  
 
• MOFCOM focuses on the impact of the merger of acquisition on competition, 
in accordance with AML Articles 3 (3), 23 (2), 27, 28, especially with the 
concern of small and medium sized companies and customers. 
• MOFCOM closely investigates the potential and existing barriers to entry, 
suppliers’ and customers’ freedom to choose between products, and other 
constraints on equivalent options in accordance with AML Article 27 and 
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MOFCOM’s Interim Provisions on Assessment of the Impact of Business 
Operator Concentration on Competition. 
• The concentration between entities holding well-known brands, with special 
regards to popular Chinese brands, may raise objections. Special regulation 
concerning well-known Chinese brands is found in MOFCOM’s Provisions 
on Foreign Investors' Merger with and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises 
Article 12. 
• The dependency on the merging companies with the concern of other vertical 
businesses and customers. Companies have to file information about their 
vertical collaborations in accordance with MOFCOM’s Guide for the Anti-
Monopoly Declaration for Foreign Investors' Merger and Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises Article 3. 
• R&D investment becomes more important if the merging parties obtain a 
large market share post-merger. The importance of R&D becomes evident 
through MOFCOM’s Interim Provision on Assessment of the Impact of 
Business Operator Concentration on Competition Article 8. 
• Market shares over 50 percent are likely to cause competitive concerns, even 
if the addition is insignificant. Important regulation on market share is AML 
Article 27 and MOFCOM’s Interim Provision on Assessment of the Impact 
of Business Operator Concentration on Competition. 
• Other important regulations mentioned in the above MOFCOM decisions are 
AML Articles 40, 23, 27, 28 and 29. 
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IV AML Article 28 – Pro-competitive effects 
AML Article 28 stipulates that if a concentration may lead to, or leads to, elimination 
or restriction of competition, MOFCOM shall prohibit the concentration. However, if 
the transaction parties can prove that the advantages of the concentration outweighs 
the disadvantages, or that the concentration is of public interest, MOFCOM may still 
allow the concentration. 
 
The seventeen published decisions so far have not indicated MOFCOM’s evaluation 
of any pro-competitive effects or public interests. But because MOFCOM only 
publishes the conditionally cleared and prohibited merger reviews, it may be hard to 
tell whether or not the exception in Article 28, second sentence has ever been 
considered. 
 
Some critics have noted that Article 28 may be used to favour consolidation between 
Chinese entities, and especially state owned entities. Amongst these critics is Mark 
Williams, which states that “this discretionary provision allows Chinese authorities 
substantial leverage when making controversial decisions concerning purely 
domestic mergers, acquisition of Chinese businesses by foreign undertakings, and 
business turnovers between two foreign undertakings that qualify the transactions for 
notification.”128 It is rather obvious that this Article’s second sentence is easier 
applied on Chinese companies than foreign ones. A merger between two Chinese 
companies may enhance technological progress within China, reinforce export, 
protect jobs and the interests of the society as a whole, and promote the development 
of the socialist market economy.129 
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The Article creates a fine line between promoting a healthy competitive market and 
politics. On one side, the Chinese market needs to be built up to withstand the huge 
amount of pressure from the outside world to be able to develop in a healthy manner. 
On the other side, it needs to adapt and conform to some international antitrust 
policies to be able to attract investment, and create a competitive environment. The 
balance between these two objectives are difficult, and it is vital that the Chinese 
antitrust regime maintains fair and equal application of the AML to all parties 
regardless of nationality, to conserve the high esteem it has acquired over the years. 
Mistrust from the international competition community could be critical for the 
Chinese economy, as it would be in any antitrust regime. However, it is crucial for 
outside observers of the Chinese merger review system that they comprehend the 
unique Chinese features which induces the requirement of certain differences in the 













Section 7 Possible Results of M&A Review 
 
Amongst substantive declarations by MOFCOM you find decisions: 
 
• unconditionally approving the concentration in accordance with AML 
Articles 25, 26 and 28; 
• conditionally approving a concentration according to AML Articles 28 and 
29; 
• prohibiting a concentration in accordance with AML Article 28; 
• ordering the entities concerned to cease implementation of the merger 
agreement, to dispose of its shares or assets within a given time, to assign its 
business within a certain time period, to implement measures to reinstate the 
market situation as it was before the implementation of the merger, and to 
accept a fine up to RMB 500,000 in case of illegal concentration.130 
 
The procedural MOFCOM decisions include a decision to enter into further review 
of a merger transaction. When such a decision is made MOFCOM shall notify the 
parties in writing in accordance with AML Article 25, which stipulates that 
MOFCOM have to notify the declaring parties of its decision after its preliminary 
review, and Article 26, which stipulates that the declaring parties shall have a 
notification from MOFCOM following their decision subsequent to their review. 
According to AML Articles 25 and 26 MOFCOM shall conduct merger review from 
the time it receives the documents submitted that conform to AML Article 23. 
MOFCOM may at any point, after accepting the documents, approve the transaction. 
The filing parties shall be notified in writing. 
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In that case MOFCOM prohibits a proposed transaction,131 they must publish the 
prohibited concentration decisions and give the parties reason for the rejection.132 
The parties may not implement or close a proposed transaction preceding of 
MOFCOM’s review and approval, according to AML Articles 25 and 26. If 
MOFCOM decides not to conduct further review or fails to make a decision within 
the time limit the undertakings may implement the concentration.133 So far, only one 
proposed concentration, Coca-Cola’s prepared acquisition of Huijuan, has been 
denied by the MOFCOM. 
 
According to Article 29 MOFCOM may impose conditions as a prerequisite for 
approval. The conditional approval must be published by MOFCOM.134 No court 
order or consent is necessary to impose such restrictions. If MOFCOM finds that the 
proposed concentration will have, or may have, restrictive or eliminating effect on 
competition in the relevant market, they may invite the transaction parties to give 
suggestions on how to remedy the undesired effects of the concentration. Pursuant to 
several of the published declarations, MOFCOM seems benevolent to find solutions 
which may allow the concentration despite the undesirable effects.135 This is also in 
accordance with the MOFCOM Review Measures136 Articles 11 to 13, which inter 
alia stipulates that the transaction parties may introduce restrictive conditions to 
remedy the undesired effects of the concentration. The restrictive conditions 
proposed must remove or reduce the unwanted effects of the concentration. 
Depending on the specific circumstances of the transaction, the restrictive conditions 
may include the following: 
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• Structural remedies requiring the parties to divest partial assets or operations, 
like the conditions set by MOFCOM in Panasonic; 
• Behavioural conditions constraining certain anticompetitive conduct, like the 
conditions set by MOFCOM in Google, Seagate, Shenhua, Delphi and InBev; 
and 
• Combination of structural remedies and behavioural conditions, like the 
conditions set by MOFCOM in Pfizer.137 
 
The parties may not appeal the MOFCOM decision before MOFCOM has performed 
an administrative reconsideration of the decision.138 It is not clear from AML Article 
53 whether procedural decisions by MOFCOM can be the subject of administrative 
or judicial review, but Judge Lu Guoqiang of the AML Tribunal of Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate Court suggested that such decisions could be reviewed.139 
 
The parties have sixty days from the date of a merger decision to petition MOFCOM 
for an administrative reconsideration according to the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law Article 9. The Supreme People’s Court has indicated that in 
cases reviewing the AML administrative decisions, the government defendant will 
bear the burden of proof to establish the foundation for its decision.140 
 
Section 8 Industry-Specific and National Security Review 
 
The AML has not implemented an antitrust related merger review by specialized 
industry regulators. Earlier drafts of the AML stipulated that specialized industry 
regulators were responsible for the AML violations in their own areas, but this 
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wording was later removed due to the fact that this would create inconsistent 
enforcement. 
 
With regards to consultation with other agencies, MOFCOM often requests input and 
advice when performing merger and acquisition review. The MOFCOM Review 
Measures141 Article 6 stipulates that MOFCOM may solicit organizational or 
individual opinions from relevant government authorities when necessary. 
 
Where a foreign investor participates in M&A of a domestic company, and this 
concentration involves a matter of national security, the concentration is not only 
subject to merger review, but also a review on national security in accordance with 
the AML Article 31, which stipulates that where a foreign investor participates in the 
concentration of undertakings by merging and acquiring a domestic enterprise which 
involves national security matters, the concentration is subject to review on national 
security as is required by the relevant State regulations, in addition to the review on 
the concentration of undertakings in accordance with the provisions of the AML. 
 
The national security review is described further in the Circular of the General Office 
of the State Council on the Establishment of Security Review System Regarding 
Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors142 (SRC) and 
the Provisions of the Ministry of Commerce for the Implementation of the Security 




According to the SRC the national security review has become necessary due to the 
increasing development of economic globalization and the further expansion of 
China’s opening up in recent years. The purpose of the security review is to create an 
orderly development of M&A of domestic enterprises by foreign investors and to 
safeguard national security. The scope of the security review is M&A of domestic 
military related entities, and entities who’s business is major farm products, energy 
and resources, infrastructure, transportation services, key technologies, and major 
equipment manufacturing involving national security matters.144 The security review 
is applicable in situations where a foreign investor gains control of a company in 
such sectors.145 
 
The State Council has established a joint ministerial panel, referred to as the joint 
conference, to conduct the review.146 This panel will assess the impact of the M&A 
on national security, including the effect on the capacity to produce domestic 
products, equipment and facilities in relation to national security, and its effect on 
stability of the national economy and the social order. The joint conference, together 
with pertinent departments, will conduct security review of merger and acquisition 
under the leadership of the State Council and be lead by the National Development 
and Reform Commission and MOFCOM in the areas involving mergers and 
acquisitions by foreign investors, according to SRC, III. This means that separate 
national security review is required alongside foreign investment approval for M&A 
transactions and, if required, merger control approval. 
 
If a foreign investor believes the transaction may touch any national security matters, 
they must file a notification to the MOFCOM.147 MOFCOM then views the case, and 
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transfers it to the security review panel if they find it to fall under the scope of the 
SCR. The panel will then conduct a general review, which may lead to a more in-
depth special review.148 The general review takes up to thirty-five working days, and 
the special review takes up to sixty working days. If the panel concludes that the 
transaction will affect the national security, the panel shall request MOFCOM and 
other agencies to take the necessary steps to eliminate the undesired effects, such as 




















Chapter 4 Extra-Territorial Application of AML 
Relating to M&A 
 
Section 1 AML Provisions 
 
AML Article 2 provides that: 
 
  “This Law is applicable to monopolistic conduct in economic activities within the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China;	  and	  it	  is	  applicable	  to monopolistic 
conducts outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China, which serve to 
eliminate or restrict competition on the domestic market of China.” 
 
Despite criticism from outside observers of the AML Drafts, claiming the Article 
could be used to support extraterritorial application of the law in cases of 
insubstantial effects on the Chinese market, the Article was not removed. Nor was 
the Article given any substantial criteria, which mean that the AML does not require 
the anticompetitive effect to be foreseeable, direct or substantial. 
 
The AML Article 2 is the foundation for extraterritorial jurisdiction when the 
proposed extraterritorial merger affects the Chinese market. The Article stipulates 
that if there is a chance that the M&A may eliminate or restrict competition in the 
Chinese market, it has to be declared by MOFCOM pursuant to the regulations in the 
AML. This “effects test” is similar to the method in other antitrust jurisdictions. 
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A rather discussed topic in the merger review context is whether the jurisdictional 
test requires an M&A to have the necessary logical relationship, or nexus, to the 
relevant jurisdiction before the transaction parties is obligated to notify the M&A. 
The criteria in the State Council’s Regulation on Declaration Thresholds Article 3 
are clear enough, but the concern is whether the notification thresholds fail to 
demand necessary nexus with China and thus creates dispensable costs and time 
delay for certain extraterritorial mergers with no impact on the Chinese market. 
 
Section 2 M&A Cases with Extra-Territorial Nexus 
 
The Coca-Cola case was the first, and only to date, prohibited case to involve 
extraterritorial effect since the AML came into effect in 2008. In this case MOFCOM 
applied the Chinese anti-monopoly laws to the conduct of Coca-Cola Company, a 
foreign firm. The legitimacy of this performance by the MOFCOM can be justified 
by the possible anticompetitive impact of the acquisition of Huiyuan on the Chinese 
market in accordance with the AML Article 2. The acquisition would without doubt 
affect the Chinese beverage market, because Huiyuan was a Chinese brand, and thus 
the acquisition was subject to M&A review by MOFCOM. 
 
The Shenhua case is to date the only published MOFCOM declaration where a 
Chinese company has been subject to merger remedies imposed pursuant to the 
AML. The fact that so few of the conditionally approved decisions involve Chinese 
companies has intensified the concern that the Chinese merger review regime may in 
practice be applied inconsistently, and in favour of domestic companies.150 However, 
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the director general of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM, Mr. Shang Ming, 
has stated that the law will be uniformly and equally applicable to both domestic and 

























The Chinese AML is general in form, with few clarifying guidelines. However, its 
general formation has made it less complicated to enact very specific and detailed 
provisions on lower government levels. The lower lever enactments have 
supplemented the AML to such degree that the M&A review process as of now 
presents itself as a coherent and complete regulatory. 
 
The MOFCOM decisions published reveals to a great extent how the government 
agency weights the different regulations when deciding the outcome of each case, 
but there is still room for improvement in this area. However, the tendency shows a 
willingness to be more and more transparent, with the increasingly detailed published 
M&A cases, and the recent announced decision to publish a list of unconditional 
M&A clearances by MOFCOM. 
To date, there have been 458 unconditionally approved concentrations, seventeen 
conditionally approved concentrations, and one denied concentration. The statistics 
shows that MOFCOM rarely interferes with any M&A transactions foreign or 
domestic. The critics’ anxiety, that the Chinese government would exploit the 
antitrust system to create a burdensome and challenging system for the foreign 
investors, has thus largely been unnecessary. 
 
The Chinese antitrust system has many similarities to other more developed antitrust 
systems, like the U.S. and Europe, though with certain special characteristics. Most 
evident is the regulations on non-competitive effects. Many observers have noted 
that these regulations have little to do with the promotion of a healthy market 
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economy, and points to the fact that such considerations historically have worked 
against creating strong markets. But taking China’s special situation, being still a 
developing country thrown into the global market competing with more developed 
market economies, there is an understandable need to protect certain aspects of the 
market at this point. The latest expert discussion on the Draft Interim Measures on 
Simplified Merger Review Procedures shows that the development in the antitrust 
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